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This book is a collection of essays seeking to investigate the much-discussed, but nonetheless fundamental, issue of variations in the legal recognition of categories of domestic relationship.  As the title suggests, the volume poses the question of how inclusive family law can ‘be(come)’​[1]​ using the theme of ‘caring and sharing’.  These two aspects of domestic life are identified by the editors as the features justifying legal recognition and adjudication for relationships, as well as being the factors proving ‘particularly problematic for women’ within those relationships.​[2]​  The book, it seems, sets out to consider the extent to which the law does and should recognise the multifarious relationships where caring and sharing are present, and what the consequences of such recognition or non-recognition are.  
The collection originated in a workshop hosted by the Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law.  Although some of the authors are based in Canada and New Zealand, many of the chapters use English Law as their primary reference point.
Following a brief introduction written by the editors, in the first substantive chapter the sociologist Carol Smart analyses the legal recognition of contemporary perceived kinship ties in England and Wales.  She uses the concept of ‘relationality’ to frame her analysis, since it moves beyond the idea of kinship being formed by blood or marriage and captures the way in which some ordinary people now think and behave.  Citing the increasing recognition of same-sex relationships and different forms of parenthood as examples, Smart argues that family law and family courts can and do ‘respond to the ways in which people enact kinship’,​[3]​ meaning that law can be a ‘kinning practice’.​[4]​  As Anne Barlow points out in the next chapter,​[5]​ however, English Law has not performed this role in relation to one of the most significant trends in contemporary kinship, since unmarried cohabitants are left without a specialised scheme of property redistribution on relationship breakdown.
The remainder of the volume is divided into four parts, each beginning with a short introduction from Bottomley and Wong and containing two substantive chapters.  In Part I, ‘Property Division in Couple Relationships’, Barlow assesses the merits of a community of property system in governing the affairs of couples, as compared to the separation of property that currently prevails in England.  Drawing heavily on the Nuffield Foundation empirical study to which she previously contributed,​[6]​ she highlights the significance of the housing market in militating against a move towards community of property in England and Wales, since the emphasis on owner-occupation often makes it necessary to meet housing needs out of capital and would reduce the effectiveness of any separate system of maintenance.  Barlow concludes that such a move towards community is unlikely since it would involve the abandonment of meeting needs as a fundamental principle.    The author also emphasises the lack of support among respondents to the empirical study for the ‘sharp regulatory divide’ between married couples and unmarried cohabitants in England and Wales.​[7]​
Wong then returns to the normative arguments invoked to justify legal intervention in domestic relationships in general.  On her account, the recognition of a wide range of domestic relationships in Australia​[8]​ suggests a shift from equality and non-discrimination towards interdependency and commitment in the normative arguments made in favour of intervention.  This in turn, Wong argues, means that there is ‘no logical reason to limit access to the law to only couple-based relationships’.​[9]​  At the same time, she recognises the inevitable difficulties in defining interdependency, particularly where non-couple caring relationships are concerned.  She suggests that the notion of ‘complementarity’ may be of assistance in this regard, which she summarises as addressing ‘the way in which the roles of the parties mesh’,​[10]​ and highlights the importance of caring in seeking a principled basis for intervention. Wong identifies the benefits of using a relational model based on overall advantage and disadvantage, such as that proposed by the Law Commission,​[11]​ to govern the actual redistribution of property among eligible parties.  But adopting terminology used by Martha Fineman,​[12]​ she criticises the Commission’s reluctance to consider ‘inevitable dependency-related needs’,​[13]​ i.e. needs such as illness and disability that do not flow from the relationship itself, since these perpetuate the idea of dependency as a problem.  It should be remembered, however, that Baroness Hale expressed some reservations about meeting needs not generated by the relationship even when using ancillary relief,​[14]​ a jurisdiction much more powerful than that proposed by the Commission for cohabitants. 
Part II of Changing Contours examines the infamous notion of ‘fairness’ when regulating relationships.  In her contribution, which she accepts is written from an ‘overtly feminist orientation’,​[15]​ Alison Diduck criticises the approach to fairness taken in England and Wales by both the judiciary in the context of ancillary relief and the Law Commission in their recent proposals concerning cohabitants.  She notes that fairness in these spheres is still thought of as part of a ‘traditional “family law as private law” paradigm’,​[16]​ such that only fairness as between the parties to the relationship is considered.  Using the work of Nancy Fraser on social justice as an illustration,​[17]​ Diduck advocates a multifaceted way of thinking about fairness.  She analyses the treatment of the concept by the judiciary and the Law Commission with reference to culture (specifically the recognition of women’s work in the home), economic factors (in particular the redistribution of property on the breakdown of a relationship) and representation (and the public and political aspects of the family).  Like Wong, she seeks to move beyond the conjugal family as the unit of regulation.  Diduck concludes by reminding the reader that ‘personal living is also social and political living’,​[18]​ and that family law could be attributed with responsibility for the level of fairness in all three realms.  The insight into political theory provided by Diduck’s chapter will certainly provide a novel and perhaps challenging viewpoint for the predominantly black-letter family lawyer.
 Claire FL Young builds on the theme of ‘fairness’ in the more technical context of Canadian tax law, where relationship status is a significant factor in determining liability.  The designation of same-sex couples as ‘common law partners’​[19]​ for tax purposes leads Young to question the relevance of relationship status for tax purposes.   This development, she argues, has reinforced socio-economic inequalities.  She points out that, contrary to the assumptions held by many, some couples pay more tax by virtue of being treated as such, with liability depending on the size, nature and distribution of their income.  On Young’s account, the reformed tax system is a tool of the trend towards privatisation, and towards imposing caring responsibilities on the family rather than on the state.  She claims that while private pension plans are heavily subsidised and citizens are encouraged to contribute to them, women find it difficult to access them.  By linking tax expenditure in this and other areas to relationship status, in turn, the state is ‘directing benefits to a very limited group of people [who] may not be the neediest.’​[20]​  Young therefore calls for a re-think of tax policies that take ‘spousal status’ into account.  The argument in her chapter provides an interesting point of comparison with the case of the Burden sisters,​[21]​ discussed elsewhere in the book,​[22]​ who are unable to claim an exemption from UK inheritance tax because they have not entered a civil partnership and are prohibited from doing so. 
Part III addresses the extent of ‘normalisation’ in the legal recognition of relationships.  Susan B Boyd and Cindy L Baldassi describe ‘marriage fundamentalism’ in Canada.  They argue that in spite of Canada’s reputation for recognising unmarried cohabitants, its law appears to recognise marriage as the ‘“gold standard” of intimate partnerships’,​[23]​ even if that is true for same- as well as opposite-sex couples.  The authors adopt spousal support claims in British Columbia as a case study, and find that the vast majority of such claims are brought by married applicants in spite of the fact that they are open to unmarried ones.  Although they are reluctant to draw firm conclusions from a small sample and conclude that few distinctions are drawn between married and unmarried couples in the cases reaching court, they identify barriers that unmarried partners are likely to face because of the requirement to show that their relationship is ‘marriage-like’.  They describe applicants who fail to meet that threshold as ‘outsiders’,​[24]​ although it must surely be accepted that all schemes for the regulation of relationships will have eligibility criteria that exclude hard cases.   But Boyd and Baldassy also identify a ‘gendered subtext’​[25]​ in cases involving both married and unmarried couples and, echoing the theme of privatisation evident in Young’s chapter, they fear that this will perpetuate inequalities.  
Nan Seuffert investigates the heteronormativity, and the consequent emergence of ‘homonormativity’, in New Zealand immigration law.  She notes what might be considered contradictory trends in immigration policy there since the September 11 attacks, with what she describes as ‘tightening and whitening’​[26]​ being combined with the recognition of same-sex relationships.  Seuffert powerfully criticises the fact that ‘homonormatised and domesticated same-sex couples, those properly raced and classed…will benefit disproportionately from the changes’,​[27]​ such that the trends she identifies are not so contradictory as they first appear.  She fears that those who are fleeing homophobic regimes and have previously been unable to ‘build up the indicia of a genuine and stable relationship’​[28]​ will face a particularly difficult time.  Again, such problems are an inevitable feature of any attempt to define relationships with reference to such indicia, but the consequences are particularly troubling in the arena with which Seuffert’s chapter is concerned.
In the final part of the book, ‘Pushing at the Contours of Domestic Relationships,’ the authors seek to move beyond ‘conventional households’​[29]​ as the spaces in which caring and sharing occur.  Bottomley addresses this theme with detailed reference to co-operative housing schemes in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, enriching the content of the book as a whole.   She points out the implications of such schemes, both in terms of their potential and their limitations, for modern attempts to revive the idea of co-operative living arrangements.  In doing so, Bottomley highlights the variety of reasons why people might live in a co-operative structure, and draws parallels such as that between the nineteenth-century desire for a ‘simple’ lifestyle and the modern emphasis on sustainability.
Susan Scott Hunt then closes the volume by examining modern ‘CoHousing’.  She discusses the possible legal structures and benefits of such a housing scheme with reference to two examples from the UK: a scheme set up by a group of middle-class friends in their thirties, and one for older women.  Scott Hunt is not yet willing to conclude that CoHousing is inherently beneficial to the wider public due to its perceived ability to support affordable housing or its environmental sensitivity.  But she would support a claim for public funding on the basis that CoHousing can address ‘issues of social cohesion and isolation, especially in such groups as the elderly in an ageing population,’​[30]​ since it could reduce the need for social care.  Readers of this journal will be all too aware that funding for social care is currently at the very forefront of the political agenda,​[31]​ rendering Scott Hunt’s chapter distinctly topical.
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